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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS-EQUAL PRO-
TECTION OF THE LAw AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. In the recent case of
DeFunis v. Odegaard,1 Judge Shorett, of the Superior Court of King County,
Washington ruled that the admissions preference accorded minority group stu-
dents by the University of Washington School of Law violated the equal protec-
tion provision of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Mr. Marco DeFunis, Jr., made application for admission in the fall, 1971,
at the University of Washington School of Law. He was white; had earned a
3.71 grade point average for his junior and senior years; held an undergraduate
degree from the University of Washington; had an average law school aptitude
test score of 582; and an average writing ability score of 61.3. The law school
received over 1,600 applications, out of which over 200 letters of acceptance
were sent. Mr. DeFunis, despite his good credentials, was not one of those ac-
cepted, but was placed on a waiting list and later sent a letter denying admis-
sion.
On the basis of validity studies conducted by the Educational Testing Ser-
vice, a formula based on the University of Washington Law School's prior ex-
perience was developed for predicting a student's first year average. Mr. DeFunis'
predicted first year average was 76.23. On the basis of an evaluation of all the ap-
plicants' credentials, the admissions committee granted letters of admission to
seventy-four persons, including thirty-six minority group applicants, who had
predicted first-year averages below that of Mr. DeFunis.
Mr. DeFunis brought suit in a Washington state court against the Univer-
sity of Washington and its law school alleging that the school's action in denying
him admission was discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. His
action was successful.
Defendant Odegaard and the University of Washington have appealed this
decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Due to the nature of
the subject matter in this case several organizations, including the American
Bar Association, the American Association of Law Schools and the Law School
Admission Council have joined in filing an amicus curiae brief. Numerous
other groups have indicated an interest in filing amicus curiae briefs.
Judge Shorett handed down an oral decision, and significant support for
his ruling exists. A historical perspective may be gained from the following cases.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as it relates to the civil
rights movement and specifically to the field of education must be viewed initially
from the landmark decision made at the end of the nineteenth century, Plessy v.
I No. 741727, Superior Court of King County, Washington, oral decision September 22,
1971, findings of fact and conclusions of law October 18, 1971, Judge Shorett.
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Ferguson.2 Mr. Justice Brown in pronouncing the opinion of the court held that
states could compel racial segregation in the use of public facilities, provided
equal facilities were available to all races. Thus the separate but equal doctrine
came into being and was sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In short, the Court had ruled that state-imposed segregation was not state dis-
crimination.
All but one of the Justices subscribed to the opinion in Plessy. That one
dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan, spoke most forcefully in denouncing the
decision announced by his colleagues. And it was this dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Harlan that stated what was to be adopted by the Court some four decades
hence.
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most power-
ful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surround-
ings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme
law of the land are involved.3
For over forty years following Plessy, the Supreme Court of the United
States heard no case which seriously challenged the validity of the separate but
equal doctrine as applied to education. Then in 1954 the monumental decision,
Brown v. Board oj Education oj Topeka,4 was handed down. It left no doubt as
to the status of Plessy.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'sep-
arate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are in-
herently unequal. 5
Brown was of course directed towards education at elementary and secondary
levels. But even prior to this decision in Brown the cases with respect to insti-
tutions of higher learning had for all practical purposes eroded the separate but
equal doctrine.
The first real break in the separate but equal doctrine occurred in 1938
as the result of efforts by a young Negro to enter law school at the University
of Missouri. The state provided no law school at the state-operated university
for Negroes but agreed to pay tuition at an out-of-state law school until a Negro
law school could be established. This arrangement requiring Negroes, but not
whites, to leave the state for a legal education was held by the Court to be a
denial of equal protection. The really significant fact of the case, however, is
2 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3 Id. at 559.
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Id. at 495.
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that it ordered the desegregation of the law school at the University of Missouri,
in view of the failure of the state to provide a law school for Negroes.'
Further developments were slowed by the years of World War II but in
1948 the battle in the Supreme Court was renewed, this time against the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma Law School, and the results of the 1938 Missouri case were
repeated. In Sipuel v. Board o/ Regents,7 the Court held that a Negro, qualified
to receive professional legal education offered by a state, cannot be denied such
education because of her color.
The State must provide [such education] for her in conformity with
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide
it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group.8
The Missouri and Oklahoma cases did not decide whether Negroes would
have to return to all-Negro schools once they were established, but that question
was pretty well put to rest by a decision in 1950 against the University of Texas. 9
In this case petitioner was denied admission to the state-supported University
of Texas Law School, solely because he was a Negro and because state law prohib-
ited the admission of Negroes to that law school. He was offered, but he refused,
enrollment in a separate law school newly established by the state for Negroes.
The University of Texas Law School had sixteen full-time and three part-time
professors, 850 students, a library of 65,000 volumes, a law review, moot court
facilities, scholarship funds, an Order of the Coif affiliation, many distinguished
alumni, and much tradition and prestige. The separate law school for Negroes
had five full-time professors, 23 students, a library of 16,500 volumes, a prac-
tice court, a legal aid association and one alumnus admitted to the Texas Bar.
Obviously the facilities at this school were poor and its prestige small. Stressing
intangible factors "which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school," a the Court found the white and Negro schools
unequal in educational quality and held that the Negro applicant had a personal
constitutional right to be considered for admission to the University of Texas
Law School without regard to race. The legal education offered the petitioner
was not substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the
University of Texas Law School and thus the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment required that he be admitted to the University of Texas
Law School.
A companion case to Sweatt, announced the same day, concerned the rights
of a Negro graduate student enrolled in the theretofore all white University of
Oklahoma.' 0 The Court noted that restrictions imposed upon the appellant im-
6 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
7 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
8 ld. at 663.
9 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
9a Id. at 634.
10 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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paired and inhibited his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange
views with other students, and in general to learn his profession.
The Sweatt and McLaurin cases, with their heavy reliance on intangible
aspects of the education process, all but completely ruled out the separate but
equal doctrine for the graduate and professional levels of public education.
True, the Court had not formally held separate but equal to be inapplicable to
graduate and professional levels, but the Court's reliance on such things as the
right to associate and to discuss ideas together suggested that segregated schools,
however equal they may have been in other respects, could never provide equality
between the races by separating them in the education process.
The significance of the above discussed cases is that the separate but equal
doctrine expounded in Plessy was laid to rest. Furthermore, the dissent of Justice
Harlan was now adopted by the full court in the Brown decision. No longer
could the state differentiate between the color of one's skin no matter how equal
the separate facilities might be! In Justice Harlan's words, the Constitution is
color-blind and "in respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Consti-
tution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public authority to
know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights.""
In a companion case to Brown,1" the Supreme Court clarified the role race
or color could play in a state's contacts with its citizens.
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particu-
lar care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitu-
tionally suspect.13
Continuing, the Court cited Gibson v. Mississippi:14
As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the principle 'that the Con-
stitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as
civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the general
government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race." 5
Mr. DeFunis attacked the law school's decision respecting his admission
denial on several grounds, including (1) the failure of the admissions committee
to give preference to Washington residents; (2) the averaging of three L.S.A.T.
scores instead of taking the final and highest score with some discount for the
learning factor; (3) the failure of the admissions committee to take into account
the grades earned in graduate work; (4) the acceptance of any applicants with
lower predicted first-year averages than his; and (5) the preferential considera-
tion accorded to minority group applicants.
11 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896).
12 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
13 Id. at 499.
14 162 U.S. 591 (1954).
15 347 U.S. at 499.
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Judge Shorett dismissed all of Mr. DeFunis' claims except his contention
of the preferential consideration accorded to minority group applicants. The
Judge noted "that the law school here wished to achieve greater minority repre-
sentation and in accomplishing this gave preference to the members of some
races."' 6 The Judge concluded by stating that Mr. DeFunis and others in a like
situation had not been accorded the equal protection of the law guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and in his findings
of fact and conclusions of law Judge Shorett states:
That in denying the plaintiff Marco DeFunis, Jr. admission to the Uni-
versity of Washington School of Law, the University of Washington has
discriminated against said plaintiff and has not accorded to him equal
protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.1'7
The position that Judge Shorett took in this case appears to be that the
state may not take into consideration a person's race or color, be it either Negro
or Caucasian; in effect the state must remain color blind insofar as race alone
is considered.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren speaking for the Court in Brown commented on
the role of state and local governments in providing education:
Such an opportunity [of an education], where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.' 8
In his oral decision, Judge Shorett commented on Brown as follows:
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. The Board of
Education, decided that public education must be equally available to
all regardless of race. After that decision, the 14th Amendment could
no longer be strecthed [sic] to accommodate the needs of any race.
Policies of discrimination will inevitably lead to reprisals. In my
opinion, the safe rule is treat all races alike and I feel that this is what
is required of an equal protection clause.19
The issue presented by the case is perhaps best brought into focus by
Charles E. Odegaard, President of the University of Washington.
It is clear that the main issue in this case turns on the interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment ... as it is applicable to the admission
of persons from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds to higher
education .... The fundamental purpose of the university's affirmative
action program in admissions is to fulfill the obligation called for by
16 57 A.B.AJ. 1234.
17 DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727, Superior Court of King County, Washington, find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, October 18, 1971, p. 9.
18 347 U.S. at 493.
19 Commentary on the DeFunis Case, 1 Balsa Reports Newsletter No. 2, February 1972,
p. 13.
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the Fourteenth Amendment by providing equal educational access to
all, including those who have been educationally disadvantaged.2 0
But achieving "equal educational access for all" is to wield a double-edged
sword. For to carve out a preferred place for one person on the primary basis
of his minority race is simultaneously denying another person the same oppor-
tunity as a result of his "majority" race!
In conclusion, two points or limitations must be kept in mind respecting
the decision in DeFunis. First, this case deals not with primary or secondary,
nor even undergraduate education, but rather with the higher institutions of
learning, on the graduate and professional level. As the cases cited have illus-
trated, the courts, and in particular the United States Supreme Court, have a
history of finding such institutions as requiring special treatment in contra.
distinction to standards relating to elementary education.
Secondly, Judge Shorett in this case specifically dealt with only one issue.
If a law school admissions committee decide to establish new criteria for ad-
mission, excluding such traditional criteria as L.S.A.T. scores, undergraduate
grade point averages, predicted first-year law school averages, and the like, a
wholly different situation may exist. The fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause may not dictate the outcome indicated in the present case. Judge Shorett
appears to have left this "door" open in that he did expressly dismiss all of
the complainant's allegations except for preferential consideration accorded to
minority group applicants.
DENNIS M. McFARLiN
20 57 A.B.AJ. 1234.

